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Temple of Preah Vihear:
Lessons on Provisional Measures
Alexandra C. Traviss*

Abstract
Cambodia and Thailand have been engaged in a territorialdispute over land in the
vicinity of the temple of Preah Vihear, located near the countries' shared border,for overffty
years. This dispute has persisted in spite of a 1962 International Court of Justice (ICJ)
judgment declaring the temple to be in Cambodia and a long history of negotiation and
mediation attemptsfollowing thejudgment. More recently, in July 2011, the IC, in connection
with a requestfor intepretation of its 1962 judgment, indicatedprovisionalmeasures creating
a demilitarized Zone around the temple and steering both countries to cooperation with the help
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The establishment of this
demilitarized Zone, which included territory not subject to overlapping claims, was hotly
contested among judges on the court, raising broader questions about the scope of the court's
authority to issue provisionalmeasures. Additionally, the court's inclusion of ASEAN as a
body to facilitate resolution of the disputefashioned the provisionalmeasures into a channelfor
integrated dispute resolution,pairingadjudication with mediation. This Comment explores the
lessons these two features of the ICJ's order teach us about the court's provisional measure
authority and use of thatauthority to effectuate dispute resolution.
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INTRODUCTION

For decades, Cambodia and Thailand have been embroiled in a dispute
over the control of land on the mountainous borderlands surrounding the
temple of Preah Vihear. A Hindi sanctuary dating back to the eleventh century,
Preah Vihear is of considerable historical and cultural significance.' In 1962, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the Temple was situated in
Cambodia.2 Since then, the temple has been the subject of protests and the site
of skirmishes. The most recent episodes of violence occurred in April 2011.
This conflict led to Cambodia's request for interpretation of the 1962
judgment and for an indication of provisional measures.' On July 18, 2011, the
ICJ responded by court order with an indication of provisional measures.' While
both parties were pleased with the indication of provisional measures,' two
features of these measures stand out: (1) the court's demarcation of a provisional
demilitarized zone (DMZ) and (2) the court's utilization of a regional body to
further cooperation between Cambodia and Thailand.' The first feature offers

1
2

22
See UNESCO, Temple of Preah Vibear, online at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1 4 (visited Apr
3, 2012). The temple is designated as a UNESCO World Heritage site. Id.
Tempe of Preah Vihear (Camb v Thai),judgment, 1962 ICJ 6,36 Oune 15, 1962) (Temple1).

3

See Richard S. Ehrlich, Thai-Cambodian Fighting Turns V/illagers to Refugees; Long-Simmering Dipute
over Holy Site along Border Boils Over, Wash Times A10 (Apr 25, 2011).

4

See Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb v Thai), Provisional Measures **2-3 (July 18, 2011), online at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/16564.pdf (visited Apr 3, 2012) (Temple I).

5

Id at *19.
See Cambodia, Thailand Agree to Solve Diputes Peacefully (Vietnam News Agency Sept 16, 2011),
online at http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Cambodia-Thailand-agree-to-solve-disputes-peacefully
/20119/20961.vnplus (visited Apr 3, 2012).

6

7

See Temple II, Provisional Measures at **19-20 (cited in note 4).
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insight into the court's authority to issue provisional measures, and the second
models a promising approach for international dispute resolution (JDR).
In fact, the provisional DMZ was at the heart of a disagreement on the
court over the scope of the ICJ's authority to indicate provisional measures.
Several of the dissenting judges believed that the scope of the provisional DMZ,
which included territory not directly subject to the parties' dispute, was an abuse
of authority. While there is no practical machinery for review of ICJ decisions,
an abuse of authority still carries real consequences. 8 Parties may pronounce the
decision a nullity, in line with customary international law, and respond with
non-compliance.' Compliance with provisional measure orders is already a
putative problem.' The court may also lose the trust of states, which is critical to
the operation of its consent-based jurisdiction." Further, an abuse of judicial
power may become entrenched in ICJ case law. Though the ICJ's decisions are
not binding beyond the parties and the dispute before the court, the court does,
in practice, treat its past decisions as highly persuasive.12 For these reasons, if the
court did abuse its authority to indicate provisional measures in the case
concerning Preah Vihear, this abuse would carry significant consequences. This
Comment will assess the legitimacy of the court's decision to include a
provisional DMZ encompassing undisputed territory in its order.
The ICJ's adoption of a measure utilizing a regional organization to
facilitate party cooperation was not a part of the debate over the court's
authority. Nonetheless, it is instructive for a separate reason. By involving a
regional mediator, the ICJ adopted an integrated IDR approach, combining the
processes of mediation and adjudication. Synergistic benefits flow from the use

8

See Ebere Osieke, The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organizations, 77 Am J
Ind L 239, 241-42 (1983) (discussing the lack of review bodies to explain why international
organizations, like the ICJ, are responsible for determining their own jurisdictions). Note that ICJ
judgments are final without opportunity for appeal. Statute of the International Court of justice,
Art 60, 59 Stat 1055 (1945) (ICJ Statute). In theory, the UN General Assembly could respond to
an ICJ abuse of power by championing a countervailing amendment of the ICJ Statute, but this
has never happened. Amendment requires a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly
and ratification by two-thirds of the states. Id at Art 69; UN Charter Art 108.

9

David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of
InternationalDispute Resolution, 84 AmJ Intl L 104, 112 & n 31 (1990).
See Shigeru Oda, ProvisionalMeasures,in Vaughan Lowe and Malgosia Fitzmaurice, eds, Ift Years
of the InternationalCourt ofjustice 541, 555 (Cambridge 1996).
Timo Koivurova, International Legal Avenues to Address the Plight of Victims of Climate
Change: Problems and Prospects, 22 J Envir L & Litig 267, 296 (2007).
Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Confladon: Preserving the Dualism offus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the
Contemporary Law of War, 34 Yale J Intl L 47, 79 (2009).

1o
11

12
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of an integrated IDR approach." This Comment will situate integrated IDR in
the context of the Cambodia and Thailand territorial dispute, as well as
provisional measures more broadly.
In Section II, I discuss the court's authority to indicate provisional
measures. Section III then provides a factual overview of the dispute between
Cambodia and Thailand, with a focus on the relevant ICJ proceedings. In
Section IV, the 2011 provisional measures order is described in detail, including
arguments advanced by both the majority and dissenting opinions. I analyze
these arguments and explore the basis of the court's authority to prescribe the
provisional DMZ in Section V. Section VI discusses the court's use of integrated
IDR in its indication of provisional measures and the benefits of replicating this
approach in future cases. Section VII concludes.
II.

ICJ PROVISIONAL MEASURES

A. Scope of ICJ Power
A provisional measure of protection, also known as an interim measure, is
a valuable procedural mechanism available to parties to a suit brought before the
ICJ. Proceedings take time,14 and states may, and often do, have an interest in
preserving the status quo while a case is pending before the court. A court
indication of provisional measures seeks to protect the respective rights of the
parties and ensure that the final judgment is not rendered ineffective." To this
end, parties can request provisional measures at any time during the
proceedings." The requesting state must specify the measures requested, reason
for the request, and consequences of refusal."
However, the court is not strictly bound to the parties' requests. Indeed,
the court may indicate measures sua sponte or indicate measures that differ from
the states' requests.' 8 The core provision conferring the ICJ with the power to
13

14

15

16

17

18

See generally Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute
Resolution, 32 U Pa J Intl L 1 (2010) (describing the deficiencies of standard IDR mechanisms and
the need for an integrated approach).
According to one estimate, the average duration of a case (from initiation to final judgment) is
approximately thirty months, though cases have lasted up to eleven years. See Arthur Eyffinger,
The InternationalCourt offustice: 1946-1996 133 (Kluwer 1996).
See Karin Oellers-Frahm, Expanding the Competence to Issue ProvisionalMeasures-Strengthening the
InternationalJudidalFunction, 12 German LJ 1279, 1279 (2011).
International Court of justice Rules of Court, Art 73 (adopted 1978, amended 2005), online at
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=3&p3=0 (visited Apr 3, 2012) (JCJ
Rules).
Id. Note that requests for provisional measures commonly provoke counter-requests for certain
measures. Thus, it need not be the case that only one party requests such measures. Oda,
ProvisionalMeasuresat 550 & n 8 (cited in note 10).
See ICJ Rules, Art 75 (cited in note 16).
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indicate provisional measures is found in Article 41 of the Statute of the Court:
"The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so
require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the
respective rights of either party."" Ultimately, these measures remain in force
for the duration of the case, unless revoked, amended, or otherwise specified.20
Over time, the court has issued a wide variety of provisional measures

reflecting the diverse body of disputes that have come before it. The ICJ has
ordered states to desist from racial discrimination, 2' refrain from executing
certain foreigners,22 abstain from nuclear testing activity,23 and limit fishing
activity,24 among other measures. Many cases have been politically charged and
mired in armed conflict. In cases implicating military action or risking outbreaks
of violence, the court typically has included measures directing parties to refrain
from action that will "aggravate or extend the dispute." 25 As to security matters,
[i]t has to be recalled that the court does not have direct responsibility for

the maintenance of international peace; that responsibility is expressly
confided in the Security Council by Article 24 of the UN Charter. On the
other hand, the court is entitled to rely on the general good faith of the
parties not to exacerbate a dispute with which it is dealing. 26
To be sure, the ICJ wields significant power in electing to issue provisional
measures and crafting the content of those measures; yet, this power is not
without bounds. Five conditions must be satisfied for the court to issue a
provisional measure: (1) prima facie jurisdiction,27 (2) a link between the
provisional measure(s) requested and the right(s) the requesting party claims to
derive from the pending judgment, 28 (3) plausibility, 29 (4) urgency,"o and (5) risk

19
20

21

22
23
24

ICJ Statute, Art 41(1) (cited in note 8).
See ICJ Rules, Art 76 (cited in note 16).
See Application of the InternationalConvention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination(Geo
v Russ), Provisional Measures, 2008 ICJ 353, 398 (Oct 15, 2008).
See LaGrand (Germ v US), Provisional Measures, 1999 ICJ 9, 16 (Mar 3, 1999).
See Nuclear Tests (Austriav Fr), Interim Protection, 1973 ICJ 99, 106 (June 22, 1973).
See FisheriesJurisdiction (UK vIce), Interim Protection, 1972 ICJ 12, 17 (Aug 17, 1972).

26

See, for example, Land and Maritime Boundag between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cam v Nigeria), Provisional
Measures, 1996 ICJ 13, 24 (Mar 15, 1996); Militay and ParamilitaUActvities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicarv US), Provisional Measures, 1984 ICJ 169, 187 (May 10, 1984); Diplomaticand ConsularStaff
Provisional Measures, 1979 ICJ at 21.
Terry D. Gill, ed, Rosenne's the World Court: What It Is and How It Works 81 (Brill 6th ed 2003). See

27

also UN Charter Art 24, 1.
Legaity of Use ofForce (Yugo v US), Provisional Measures, 1999 ICJ 916, 923 (June 2, 1999).

25

28

29

30

Temple II, Provisional Measures at *9 (cited in note 4).
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (BeIg v Sen), Provisional Measures, 2009 ICJ
139, 151 (May 28, 2009).
Passage through the GreatBelt (Fin v Den), Provisional Measures, 1991 ICJ 12, 17 (July 29, 1991).
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of irreparable prejudice.3' These conditions are laid out in the court's
jurisprudence and are grounded in the very purpose of a provisional measure: to
preserve the respective rights of the parties. The rights to be protected must be
those at issue in the main proceeding, thus the "link" requirement. Given the
potential gravity of an indication of provisional measures-protecting a party's
rights will, in effect, constrain the other party and may even frustrate its political
interests-there must be good reason for such an order. Provisional measures
would be inappropriate if the rights at stake could be protected adequately by
compensation awarded in a final judgment.32 Therefore, the court seeks proof of
urgency, irreparable prejudice, and plausibility. Owing to the interlocutory nature
of provisional measures, the decision whether to order these measures should
not prejudice the case merits, which are judged in the main proceeding.3 3
Provisional measures are curbed in another notable way: lack of a direct
enforcement mechanism.34 Under Article 94(1) of the UN Charter, members
party to an ICJ case should "undertakefl to comply with the decision." Further,
[if] any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it
under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse
to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment. 35
However, the Security Council has not acted yet under this provision to impose
sanctions or authorize military activity to enforce a judgment. 36 A decision to do
so would be entirely within the council's discretion but subject to council power
and political dynamics. Moreover, Article 94(2) speaks of judgments, not
orders, and the Security Council has questioned its own ability to enforce
provisional measure orders.3 ' As a result, enforcement rests largely on states'
willingness to comply and to exercise domestic executive powers.

31

Fisheiesjurisdiction, Interim Protection, 1972 ICJ at 16.

32

Oda, ProtisionalMeasuresat 551 (cited in note 10).

33

See Aegean Sea ContinentalShelf Case (Gre v Tur), Interim Protection, 1976 ICJ 3, 13 (Sept 11, 1976).

34

"[I]nternational tribunals do not operate as part of a coherent and unified world government.
They exist in an interstitial legal system that lacks a hierarchy, an enforcement mechanism, and a
legislative instrument that allows for centralized change." Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, judicial
Independence in InternationalTribunals, 93 Cal L Rev 1, 13 (2005).

3s

UN Charter Art 94, 2.

36

See Christopher Greenwood, The Role of the InternationalCourt ofJustice in the Global Community, 17
UC Davis J Intl L & Poly 233, 247 (2011).

37

For example, a permanent member of the Council could exercise its veto rights against a
resolution to enforce an ICJ judgment. The US Supreme Court noted this possibility in its Medellin
decision. See Medellin v Texas, 552 US 491, 509-10 (2008).
See 2 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 903 n 6 (1987).

38
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Nevertheless, compliance rates with ICJ judgments are considered high.
One study estimates a 68 percent compliance rate. When decisions were
categorized by topic, the compliance rate rose to 86 percent for border and
maritime delimitation cases.' Rational choice theory would sooner predict no
compliance, given the lack of centralized sanctions.41 The high rate of
compliance, in spite of the lack of an institutional enforcement mechanism, has
been explained variously by the reputational costs of non-compliance, the
benefit of third-party expression to resolve ambiguity, and the utility of
continued access to ICJ adjudication.42 In contrast, scholars note the
comparatively low, even "abysmal," incidence of compliance with provisional
measures orders. 43 This has been attributed to perceptions that the measures are
prescribed without the provision of due process and represent an improper

3

Tom Ginsburg and Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicaing in Anarchy: An Expressive Theoy of
International Dispute Resolution, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev 1229, 1315 (2004). International
organizations, such as the WTO, similarly are considered to have high rates of dispute resolution
compliance. Id at 1238. According to one estimate, parties successfully implement 83 percent of
WTO panel reports. William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J
Intl Econ L 17, 47 (2005).

40

See Ginsburg and McAdams, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1315 (cited in note 39).

41

See id at 1239.
See id at 1238; Posner and Yoo, 93 Cal L Rev at 20-21 (cited in note 34).

42

43

See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Power and Purpose of InternationalLaw: Insights from the Theof and
Practice of Enforcement 306 (Oxford 2008); William J. Aceves, LaGrand (Germany v. United States), in
Bernard H. Oxman, ed, InternationalDecisions, 96 Am J Intl L 210, 218 (2002); Michael K. Addo,
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United States of America) ("Breard") and
LaGrand (Germany v United States of America), Applicationsfor ProvisionalMeasures, in Malcolm D.
Evans, ed, Decisions of InternationalTribunals: The InternationalCourt ofJusice, 48 Intl & Comp L Q
673, 680 (1999); Oda, ProvisionalMeasures at 555 (cited in note 10).
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exercise of the court's authority." Additionally, prior to the ICJ's LaGran"
decision, some parties treated provisional measures as non-binding.46
B. Evolution of Provisional Measures
Since 1922, the ICJ and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of
International Justice, have heard nearly fifty requests for provisional or interim
measures. 47 Ten such requests were made in the most recent decade, 20002010.48 Court treatment of these provisional measures requests has evolved in
recent history. While the doctrine of stare decisis does not formally apply to the
ICJ-decisions bind only the parties in the instant case49-in practice, the court
regards its decisions as highly persuasive, perhaps even precedential. 0 For this
reason, ICJ cases do tend to build off of one another, and the court's
jurisprudence can be framed in a way that reveals evolution in its rulings.
In 1999, the court held in Legality of Use of Force that it could issue
provisional measures without "finally satisfy[ing] itself that it has jurisdiction on
the merits of the case" so long as there is a prima facie indication of
jurisdiction." Given the interlocutory nature of an interim measure order, the
court exercises a form of incidental jurisdiction. 2 The prima facie jurisdiction

Q at

680 (cited in note 43); Oda, ProvisionalMeasuresat 554 (cited in

44

See Addo, 48 Intl & Comp L
note 10).

45

LaGrand (Gerv US), Judgment, 2001 ICJ 466 Oune 27, 2001). In 1982, Karl and Walter LaGrand,
both German nationals, killed one individual and severely injured another in an armed robbery of
an Arizona bank. Id at 475. Following criminal proceedings in Arizona, both men were convicted
of murder in the first degree (among other crimes) and sentenced to death. Id. However, at this
time, the German consular post was not alerted of the LaGrands' arrest, and neither man was
informed of his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a convention to
which both the US and Germany were parties. Id. The day before Walter LaGrand's scheduled
execution, Germany instituted ICJ proceedings against the US and requested that the US stay
Walter LaGrand's execution until the ICJ rendered a final decision on the merits. LaGrand,
Judgment, 2001 ICJ at 478-79. Though the ICJ granted Germany's request for provisional
measures, Walter LaGrand was executed as scheduled. Id. In its 2001 judgment, the ICJ held that
the US breached Vienna Convention obligations owed to Germany. Id at 515-16. Further, the
court concluded that provisional measures were binding (a point of dispute between the parties)
and held that the US breached the ICJ order indicating provisional measures. Id at 506, 516.

46

See LaGrand,Judgment, 2001 ICJ at 506, 516. See also O'Connell, Power and Purpose of International
Law at 307-09 (cited in note 43).
ICJ, List of Contentious Cases ly Date of Intmduction, online at http://www.icj-

47

cij.org/docket/index.php?pl =3&p2=

3

(visited Apr 3, 2012).

48

See id.

49

ICJ Statute, Art 59 (cited in note 8).

50

Sloane, 34 Yale J Intl L at 79 (cited in note 12).

51

Legality of Use ofForce, Provisional Measures, 1999 ICJ at 923.

52

See J.G. Merrills, InternationalDispute Settlement 124 (Cambridge 5th ed 2011).
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requirement is an attempt to balance the risk of state abuse of the device with
the risk of irreparable harm to the rights at issue.
Two years after Legality of Use of Force, the court ruled in LaGrand that
provisional measures were binding." In light of the prima facie jurisdiction
requirement, this enables the court to issue binding provisional measures when
jurisdiction is later deemed absent, an apparent expansion of the court's
competence.54 Further, as a general matter, there is no option to appeal."
The ICJ issued its first provisional measure in an Article 60 proceeding in
2008. Under Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ, parties that dispute the
meaning or scope of an ICJ judgment can later ask the court to interpret that
judgment." The court's jurisdiction to hear the original dispute confers upon it
the jurisdiction to later interpret the judgment, despite the fact that a state's
consent to jurisdiction may have since lapsed." The indefinite nature of Article
60 jurisdiction and the binding nature of an Article 41 provisional measure is a
powerful combination-a combination that court dissenters have questioned.
Scholars have also criticized the reach of the court's provisional measures
in recent years. Former ICJ Judge Shigeru Oda has expressed concern over
attempts by the ICJ to "deliver an interim judgment under the name of
provisional measures,"6 for the measures may prejudge the merits of the case.
The court's indication of provisional measures in the Preah Vihear case
directly implicates concerns over the ambit of the ICJ's Article 41 powers. It was
the second case in which the court indicated provisional measures pending an
Article 60 interpretation proceeding and the first case in which the court clearly
delimited a DMZ. The main source of division among the judges on the court

s3

See LaGrand,judgment, 2001 ICJ at 506.

54

Oellers-Frahm, 12 German L J at 1292-93 (cited in note 15).

5s

ICJ Statute, Art 60 (cited in note 8). The ICJ has been described as "a court of first instance for
contentious cases, with no possibility of appeal." Nienke Grossman, Legitmay and International
Adjudicative Bodies, 41 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 107,150 (2009).
See generally Requestfor Interpretationof the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and

36

Other Mexican Nationals (Mex v US) (Mex v US), Provisional Measures, 2008 ICJ 311 (July 16,
2008).
57

ICJ Statute, Art 60 (cited in note 8).

58

See id; Temple II, Provisional Measures at *6 (cited in note 4).

59

See, for example, Temple of Preah Vihear (Camb v Thai), Provisional Measures *1, online at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/16576.pdf (visited Apr 3, 2012) (Donoghue dissenting)
(Temple II, Donoghue Dissent). See also Requestfor Interpretationof the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in
the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex v US) (Mex v US), Provisional
Measures, 2008 ICJ 311, 340 (July 16, 2008) (Buergenthal dissenting).

60

Oda, ProvisionalMeasures at 554 (cited in note 10).
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was the scope of this provisional DMZ and the fact that it covered undisputed
territory in both countries.6 '
III. BACKGROUND ON THE TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR
DISPUTE
Though the dispute concerning the Preah Vihear temple did not come
before the ICJ until 1962, and then again in 2011 in the form of a request for
interpretation, events that gave rise to the dispute date back to 1904. In 1904,
France (then in control of Cambodia) and Siam (modern-day Thailand) entered
into a treaty that described the frontier between Siam and Cambodia by
reference to certain geographic features.62 In the region surrounding Preah
Vihear, the border was to be determined by the watershed line delimited by a
mixed commission, consisting of Siamese and French representatives.6 ' Tracing
the boundary by the watershed line would have placed the temple in Siam.64
Then, in 1907, the French government arranged for a series of frontier
maps to be drafted and published. 5 One of these maps covered the Preah
Vihear region, but due to deviations from the watershed line, it showed the
temple's location on Cambodian territory. These maps were distributed to
members of the Siamese government, including mixed commission officials,
shortly after publication.6 ' But it was not until 1958, during negotiations with
Cambodia concerning various territorial matters, that Thailand directly and
explicitly contested the territorial sovereignty of the temple.
In 1959, Cambodia instituted proceedings against Thailand, calling upon
the ICJ to declare that Preah Vihear was situated in Cambodia and to order the
removal of Thai forces (present since at least 1954) from the temple. In its
1962 judgment (Temple 1),7 the court reasoned that Thailand had tacitly accepted
Cambodia's sovereignty over the temple by failing to object to the rival claim

61

See Section V.

62

63

Temple I, Judgment, 1962 ICJ at 16.
Id at 17.

64

See id at 21.

65

Id at 20.

66

Temple I, Judgment, 1962 ICJ at 20-21. Thailand pled that "the map embodied a material error,
not explicable on the basis of any exercise of discretionary powers of adaptation which the
Commission may have possessed." Id at 21. However, Thailand did not go so far as to plead that
this error was deliberate. Id.

67

Id at 23.

68

Temple I,Judgment, 1962 ICJ at 28, 32.

69

Id at 8.

7o

To distinguish the 1962 judgment from the 2011 indication of provisional measures, the court
decisions are referred to as Temple I and Temple II, respectively.
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represented by the 1907 map for nearly 50 years. It found that Cambodia had
relied on Thailand's acceptance of the map and that Thailand's plea of errorthe map's deviation from the watershed line-did not vitiate consent, since the
country was on notice of this error.72 The court thus ruled that: (1) the temple is
in Cambodia; (2) Thailand must withdraw its forces, guards, and keepers from
the temple and "its vicinity on Cambodian territory"; and (3) Thailand must
return artifacts removed from the temple to Cambodia.73
Tension between the countries reignited in 2008, following Cambodia's
nomination of the temple as a UNESCO World Heritage site. Thailand reacted
because Cambodia initially pursued registration of the site without its agreement,
and land surrounding the temple, purportedly belonging to Thailand, was
included in the application." Although Thai leaders later supported the
application, the temple became the object of protests and political contention."
Bilateral negotiations failed, and Thailand initially rejected assistance from
7
ASEAN, an organization promoting peace and stability in the region.
The dispute began to escalate. Over 1,500 Thai and Cambodian soldiers
were deployed to Preah Vihear, and border tension bled over to other temples.
What followed was a series of military clashes beginning in October 2008 and
lasting well into 2011. The fighting took lives, displaced residents of nearby
villages from their homes, and continued in spite of ceasefire agreements. 9
On April 28, 2011, Cambodia requested that the ICJ interpret its 1962
ruling. Cambodia alleged that there was a dispute over the meaning and scope of
the judgment's "vicinity on Cambodian territory" language, the duration of
Thailand's obligation to withdraw from the temple and its vicinity, and the

n

See Temple I, Judgment, 1962 ICJ at 30-31.

72

See id at 26-27.

73

Id at 36-37.

74

See Q&A: Thailand-Cambodia Temple Dispute (BBC Sept 14, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12378001 (visited Apr 3, 2012).

75

See A Cambodia Team to Visit Bangkok on Preab Vihear Issue (Nation Feb 21, 2008), online at
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/The/20Region/A-Cambodia-team-to-visit-Bangkok-onPreah-Vihear-i-30066069.html (visited Apr 3, 2012).
See Noppadon Must Go: Academics (Nation July 8, 2008), online at http://www.nationmultimedia.
com/national/Noppadon-must-go-academics-30077548.html (visited Apr 3, 2012).
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See UN Help Sought over Temple Row (BBC July 22, 2008), online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/asia-pacific/7518741.stm (visited Apr 3, 2012).
See id; Khmer's Hun Sen Congratulates Thai PM (Nation Sept 20, 2008), online at http://
www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/09/20/politics/politics-30083957.php (visited Apr 3, 2012).
See Temple II, Provisional Measures at *13 (cited in note 4). According to one estimate, Preah
Vihear clashes claimed twenty-eight lives in 2011. Border Pullback Agreed (Bangkok Post Dec 21,
2011), online at http://m.bangkokpost.com/news/271899 (visited Apr 3, 2012).
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binding nature of the 1907 map in establishing the countries' frontier.so The
court agreed that such a dispute existed and acceded to the request.8'
Cambodia also requested that the Court order Thai forces to withdraw
from Cambodian territory near the temple, cease military action, and refrain
from activity that could "aggravate the dispute in the principal proceedings." 82 In
a July 18, 2011 order (Temple II), the ICJ indicated that:"
Both Parties shall immediately withdraw their military personnel currently
present in the provisional demilitarized zone . . . and refrain from any

military presence within that zone and from any armed activity directed at
that zone;
Thailand shall not obstruct Cambodia's free access to the Temple of Preah
Vihear or Cambodia's provision of fresh supplies to its non-military
personnel in the Temple;
Both Parties shall continue the co-operation which they have entered into
within ASEAN and, in particular, allow the observers appointed by that
organization to have access to the provisional demilitarized zone; [and]
Both Parties shall refrain from any action which might aggravate or extend
the dispute before the Court or make it more difficult to resolve[.] 84
Despite the fact that the area of overlapping claims near the temple was
confined to approximately five square kilometers, the provisional DMZ
encompassed an area of approximately seventeen square kilometers." While one
minister questioned whether the ICJ order violated state sovereignty,86 on the
whole, Thailand and Cambodia reacted favorably to the ICJ judgment, affirming
their commitment to comply with the ICJ order and peacefully resolve the
border dispute.8 Cambodia's foreign minister equated the order to "a permanent
ceasefire,"" and Thailand's prime minister noted that successful compliance
depended largely on the countries' ability to coordinate military pullback."
80

Temple II, Provisional Measures at *7 (cited in note 4).

81

Id at *8.

82

Id at *5.

83

The Rules of the Court expressly authorize departures from the requested measures. ICJ Rules,
Art 75, 2 (cited in note 16).
Temple If Provisional Measures at **19-20 (cited in note 4).

84
85

See Leng Bunthea, DemiitariZed Zone Setfor Border Confket, 5 Econ Today 1, 33 (Aug 2011), online
2
http://cambodianembassy.org.uk/newsletters/cat6/POLITICS%20&%/20SOCIETY% 0at
%20AUGUST/o202011 .pdf (visited Apr 3, 2012).

86

Thomas Fuller, Court OrdersThailand and Cambodia to Withdrawfrom Disputed Temple, NY Times Al 2
(July 19, 2011).
See Cambodia, ThailandAgree to Solve Disputes Peacefully (cited in note 6).

87
88

Arthur Max, UN Court Draws DMZ for Thai, Cambodia Troops (AP July 18, 2011), online at
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=14094014#.TswOaniMelqQ (visited Apr 3,
2012).
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Though the order was well received by the parties, there was vigorous
disagreement on the court over the ICJ's authority to create the provisional
DMZ. The following section describes the majority and dissenting positions.
IV. COURT DIVISION
A. Court Majority
In an order responding to Cambodia's request for provisional measures,
the court, in step-wise fashion, assessed whether each of the five preconditions
for an indication of provisional measures was met. The court majority
determined that a dispute regarding the meaning or scope of the 1962 judgment
existed; therefore, there was prima facie jurisdiction under Article 60 of the
Statute of the ICJ, which addresses proceedings aimed at interpreting a prior
judgment.o The majority noted that this jurisdiction exists indefinitely, given the
lack of a time requirement in Article 60." This is particularly important because
Thailand's consent to jurisdiction had lapsed in the time since the initial
judgment.92 The requirement that there be a link between the measures
requested and the rights underpinning the main proceeding was also met.
Cambodia's proposed provisional measures were designed to protect the
country's territorial integrity and sovereignty over the area surrounding the
temple." The rights of sovereignty and territorial integrity are precisely what
Cambodia claimed stemmed from the ICJ's 1962 judgment.' 4 Further, they were
plausible rights." Noting the clashes in February and April of 2011 and the failed
ASEAN intervention, the court determined that
the situation in the area of the Temple of Preah Vihear remains unstable
and could deteriorate . . . [and] because of the persistent tensions and

absence of a settlement to the conflict, there is a real and imminent risk of
irreparable prejudice being caused to the rights claimed by Cambodia.96

In light of these circumstances, the majority concluded that there was indeed
urgency and risk of irreparable prejudice, fulfilling the final two preconditions.97
Satisfied that provisional measures were appropriate, the majority
proceeded to set out the measures. Far less analysis was provided to rationalize
9

Temple II, Provisional Measures at **6-8 (cited in note 4).

91

Id at *10.

92

See Temple of Preah Vibear (Camb v Thai), Preliminary Objections, 1961 ICJ 17, 24 (May 26, 1961).

93

Temple II, Provisional Measures at *4, *11 (cited in note 4).
94

Id at *11.

95

Id at *10 (concluding that the rights were plausible because they were based on a rational
interpretation of Temple I that the court, in reaching its decision, recognized a frontier between
Cambodia and Thailand that placed the temple and its vicinity in Cambodia).

96

Id at *15.

9

Temple II, Provisional Measures at *15 (cited in note 4).
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the choice of measures. A desire to preserve specific rights, to "preventl the
aggravation or extension of the dispute," and, through the DMZ, "to prevent
irreparable damage from occurring," appeared to guide the court's choice of
measures." In a conscious departure from Cambodia's proposals, the majority
indicated measures applying to both states. Both parties were ordered to remove
military personnel and cease armed activity directed at the zone. Four
coordinates, depicted on a sketch map, defined the DMZ bounds."
B. Dissenting Opinions
Four of the five dissenting judges criticized the conclusion that the
provisional DMZ was linked sufficiently to the rights to be protected in the
main proceeding.' Judges Donoghue and Owada framed this criticism in terms
of jurisdictional constraints and argued that provisional measures are
circumscribed by the jurisdictional limitations placed on the main case, given the
need to "preserve the respective rights of either party." 0 ' Under this view, the
provisional measures in Temple II should be subject to both the requirements of
Articles 41 and 60. Judge Donoghue used Avena, the only other Article 60 case
in which the ICJ ordered provisional measures, to illustrate this interplay.102
Since the court should not go beyond the scope of the underlying judgment it is
asked to interpret (for example, by considering facts subsequent to that
judgment), it should be so bound when ruling on provisional measures.103
According to this position, the provisional DMZ represents an
overextension of court authority in three important ways.104 First, territoriality of
98

See id at **15-16.

99

Id at *16.

100

See Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at *5 (cited in note 59); Temple of Preah Vibear (Camb v Thai),
at
http://www.icj2011),
online
*4
(July
18,
Measures
Provisional
cij.org/docket/files/151/16574.pdf (visited Apr 3, 2012) (Xue dissenting) (Temple II, Xue
Dissent); Temple of Preab Vibear (Camb v Thai), Provisional Measures *1 (July 18, 2011), online at
(visited Apr 3, 2012) (Al-Khasawneh
http://www.ic-cij.org/docket/files/151/16570.pdf
dissenting) (Temple II, Al-Khasawneh Dissent); Temple of Preab Vibear (Camb v That), Provisional
Measures *1 (July 18, 2011), online at http://www.ic-cij.org/docket/files/151/16566.pdf (visited
Apr 3, 2012) (Owada dissenting) (Temple II, Owada Dissent).

101

See Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at *1 (cited in note 59); Temple II, Owada Dissent at *1 (cited in
note 59). Judge Donoghue cites Bosnia v Serbia as a case that articulates this principle: "[he
Court, having established the existence of a basis on which its jurisdiction might be founded,
ought not to indicate measures for the protection of any disputed rights other than those which
might ultimately form the basis of a judgment in the exercise of that jurisdiction." Temple II,
Donoghue Dissent at *6 (cited in note 100), citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishmentofthe Crime of Genodde (Born v Yugo), Provisional Measures, 1993 ICJ 3, 19 (Apr 8, 1993).

102

See Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at *1 (cited in note 59).

103

Seeidat*3.

104

One of the dissenting judges, Judge Cot, did not suggest that the provisional DMZ was beyond
the court's authority, but rather criticized it as ill-advised, given the lack of topographical
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the temple was undisputed, as was certain land encompassed by the DMZ, so
there were no rights that should have been preserved with respect to that land.
In other words, the link between the right to sovereignty and the measure, so far
as the undisputed land was concerned, was incomplete. Provisional measures
should have been limited to disputed areas,"0 s consistent with right of state
sovereignty.' Second, the present-day conflict concerns facts beyond the 1962
judgment, and is consequently outside of the ICJ's jurisdiction. The court cannot
declare remedies (including non-aggravation directives) addressing this conflict.
Jurisdiction to order such expansive remedies ended when Thailand's consent
lapsed.' 7 Lastly, the majority's exercise of authority was unprecedented and
without valid justification.'os This argument is less about the link requirement
and more about the perceived departure from the persuasive authority of past
decisions. Of the three prior cases in which the ICJ ordered parties to withdraw
forces from an area, no provisional DMZs were created and undisputed territory
was not implicated. There provisional DMZ was unnecessary, as other measures
were available that fit more squarely within the court's authority.'
In light of these excesses, dissenters expressed concerns about future party
behavior. Judge Donoghue believed the order might chill state consent to ICJ
jurisdiction in the future."0 Fearful of court proclivity to indicate provisional
measures that unjustly infringe on state sovereignty, states might not agree to
ICJ jurisdiction ex ante. After all, other dispute resolution options are often
available."' Further, given the central role of consent in ICJ cases, court abuse of
power could diminish the court's role in the international legal arena. 112 Party

101

106

information and potential challenges in implementation. See Temple of Preah t/ibear (Camb v Thai),
at
http://www.ic18,
2011),
online
**4-5
(July
Measures
Provisional
cij.org/docket/files/151/16581.pdf (visited Apr 3, 2012) (Cot dissenting) (Temple II, Cot Dissent).
The disputed area has been described as a 4.6 square-kilometer zone near the temple of
overlapping claims. See Bunthea, 5 Econ Today at 33 (cited in note 85).
See Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at **5-6 (cited in note 59); Temple II, Xue Dissent at *1 (cited in
note 100); Temple II, Owada Dissent at **3-4 (cited in note 100). Judge Donoghue notes that it
may be acceptable in an Article 36 case to order measures that apply to undisputed territory in the
interest of non-aggravation; however, he contends that the limited nature of Article 60
proceedings forecloses this justification in Temple II. See Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at *7 (cited
in note 59). According to Judge Owada, the UN Security Council, not the ICJ, has the power to
order such measures without state consent. Temple II, Owada Dissent at *3 (cited in note 100).

107

Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at *6 (cited in note 59).

10

Temple II, Xue Dissent at **1-2 (cited in note 100); Temple II, Owada Dissent at **2-3 (cited in
note 100).

109

Temple II, Xue Dissent at *3 (cited in note 100); Temple II, Owada Dissent at **3-4 (cited in note
100); Temple II, Al-Khasawneh Dissent at *1 (cited in note 100).

110

Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at *8 (cited in note 59).

"I

See Section VI.

112

See Koivurova, 22 J Envir L & Litig at 296 (cited in note 11).
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consent also is correlated demonstrably with judgment compliance rate." 3 Judge
Cot feared that parties would attempt to circumvent the consent requirement by
grafting a new case onto the request for interpretation." 4 Provisional measures
could be brought to bear on rights tangentially connected to a request for
interpretation with Article 60 functioning as a mere vehicle for jurisdiction." 5
Moreover, dissenters found fault in the practicality and efficacy of the
provisional DMZ. They noted that the DMZ introduces implementation
challenges making it inferior to other measures.116 Removed from the ground
situation, the court lacked information to design around these challenges."'
Collectively, the dissenting judges presented several alternatives that could
have ameliorated these issues. The court could have limited the DMZ to the
disputed area, which was nearly one-quarter the area of the court-defined
zone."' Alternatively, the ICJ could have banned military activity "in the area of
the temple"-language bearing likeness to the 1962 judgment." 9 The parties also
could have been given a chance to define the DMZ with ASEAN assistance,
failing which the court would intervene.120 Lastly, the court could have expedited
a decision on the merits, doing away with provisional measures altogether. 2'
In the next section, I analyze the majority and dissenting opinions in
tandem to determine whether the court did, in fact, exceed its authority.
Additionally, I assess the consequences of problems posed by the ordered DMZ.

113
114

See Posner and Yoo, 93 Cal L Rev at 37 (cited in note 34).
Temple II, Cot Dissent at *3 (cited in note 104).

115

See id.

See Temple II, Xue Dissent at *3 (cited in note 100); Temple II, Owada Dissent at *4 (cited in note
100); Temple II, Cot Dissent at **4--5 (cited in note 104). The parties presumably have a better
sense of the bounds of the disputed territory than the artificial demarcations on the ICJ-created
sketch map. Temple II, Owada Dissent at *4 (cited in note 100).
117 See Temple II, Xue Dissent at *3 (cited in note 100). While the court did have some information
about the topography of the zone, topography does not fully capture ground realities that bear on
the ease of implementing the DMZ. See Temple II, Owada Dissent at *4 (cited in note 100).
116

118

See Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at *6 (cited in note 59). The disputed area was a 4.6 squarekilometer zone and the provisional DMZ a 17.4 square-kilometer zone. Bunthea, 5 Econ Today at
33 (cited in note 85).

119

Temple II, Xue Dissent at *3 (cited in note 100); Temple II, Al-Khasawneh Dissent at *1 (cited in
note 100).
Temple II, Xue Dissent at *3 (cited in note 100).

120

121 See Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at *3 (cited in note 59).
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ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT OVER THE PROVISIONAL

DMZ
Assuming there is a dispute over the scope or meaning of the 1962
judgment, 2 2 the majority and dissenting opinions agree that there is: (1) prima
facie jurisdiction, (2) a plausible right to be protected, (3) urgency, and (4) risk of
irreparable prejudice. What remains is a dispute over the link between the alleged
rights and the provisional measures-in particular, the DMZ. Central to this
dispute is an argument over the allowable geographic scope of the DMZ.123
A. Spatial Concerns: Inclusion of Undisputed Areas
The rights to be preserved in the main proceeding are the rights to
sovereignty and territorial integrity.124 Th1 court majority finds that the DMZ
preserves these rights. 125 Even so, the court arguably has overstepped what was
necessary by including undisputed areas. These undisputed areas lack the link to
the rights underpinning the main proceeding, and including these areas in the
DMZ may itself actively infringe the parties' rights. This reasoning raises the
question: How broad are the measures of preservation that the court can
legitimately order? Also, is the court limited to what is necessary and no more?
The statutory language granting the ICJ power to order provisional
measures supports a broad construction of the type and scope of measures
available to the court. It reads: "The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it
considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought
to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party."'126 This language is
both broad ("any") and restrictive ("ought to be taken" and "circumstances so
require"). The "if it considers" and "ought to be taken" language introduce
subjective elements, which nod to the court's discretion in ordering provisional
measures.127 The language seems to place greater restriction on the
circumstances giving rise to provisional measures than on the nature or scope of
the measures. Only "ought to be taken" seems to constrain the breadth of the

124

Judge Cot expressed skepticism regarding this point in his dissent. See Temple II, Cot Dissent at
**2-3 (cited in note 104). If there is no basis for the Article 60 proceedings, then provisional
measures could not in turn be issued in this case due to lapse of consent.
As a threshold matter, judge Donoghue takes issue with the indication of (any) provisional
measures motivated by events subsequent to Temple I. See Section V.B. Nevertheless, it is the
scope of the DMZ that dominates the debate between the majority and dissenting judges.
Temple II, Provisional Measures at *11 (cited in note 4).

125

See id at *16.

126

ICJ Statute, Art 41(1) (cited in note 8).
See Oellers-Frahm, 12 German LJ at 1282 (cited in note 15) ("[T]he power of the judicial body is
not strictly defined but is, to a high degree, discretionary, a fact that is inherent in the character of
the institution of interim protection.").

122

123

127
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measures. Yet, the court has discussed "ought" in the context of whether
provisional measures are binding as opposed to the measures' scope.128
Provisional measures have been described as necessary safeguards to
parties' rights.'29 However, "necessary" does not by definition mean that a
particular measure must be the only way to protect these rights.'3 0 It implies a
relationship between the measures and the protection of rights (a return to the
notion of a link), but various measures may satisfy this requirement. 3 ' For
example, a DMZ covering only disputed land and a DMZ as defined in Temple II
both may satisfy the link requirement. The plural "any provisional measures"
language is compatible with, and perhaps even supportive of, this view.
Further, if the provisional DMZ can be framed as a non-aggravation
measure, the non-aggravation element may:
widen the margin of appreciation of the Court in determining what
measures should be ordered. In particular, the existence of a risk of
aggravation of a dispute may justify the indication by the Court of measures
that are not strictly needed to prevent the rights of the parties from being
irreparably prejudiced.132
This accords the ICJ more leeway as circumstances become more exigent. Thus,
the DMZ does not have to be necessary, suggesting that the inclusion of
undisputed territory does not flout the limitations of provisional measures.
Moreover, the inclusion of undisputed territory in a DMZ may itself serve
a variety of purposes, purposes that would provide valid justification for the
majority's order and strengthen the link between the provisional DMZ and the
rights to be protected.'33 For example, it could create a buffer zone to distance
fighting parties from one another or to reduce the chance that armed activity
128

129

130

131
132

133

See LaGrand,judgment, 2001 ICJ at 501-03 (noting that the French and English versions of
Article 41 are "not in total harmony," and that while the "ought," "indicate," and "suggested"
language from this article does not imply that provisional measures are binding, the purpose of
the statute does imply binding character).
See id at 503 ("[T]he power to indicate provisional measures entails that such measures should be
binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on the necessity, when the circumstances call
for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties.").
"Necessary" means "required to be done, achieved, or present; needed." "Require" means
"needed for a purpose or dependent on." See Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway
to Incorporating Human Rights Issues into InternationalInvestment Agreements, 49 Colum J Transnad L
670, 709 (2011), quoting The Concise Oxford Engish Dictionary 956, 1222 (Oxford 11th ed 2008). It
follows that a necessary measure is one needed for the purpose of preserving the rights of the
parties. See Choudhury, 49 Colum J Transnatl L at 709. According to these definitions, a
necessary measure need not mean that it is the "only way" to achieve a stated objective. Id.
See id.
Paolo Palchetti, The Power of the InternationalCourt ofJusice to Indicate ProvisionalMeasures to Prevent the
Aggravaion of a Dispute, 21 Leiden J Intl L 623, 637 (2008).
Recall that the dissenting judges criticized the provisional DMZ for lack of a valid justification
and a logical link to the rights to be preserved. See Section IV.B.
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directed at an area adjacent to the DMZ would inflict damage on the temple or
people within the DMZ.'3 4 Additionally, the armed conflict concerning the
border dispute in the area of Preah Vihear is not clearly confined to territory of
overlapping claims.'35 This could further justify the inclusion of "undisputed"
land. Regrettably, the court did not articulate any of these rationales for the zone
that it selected." 6 Nevertheless, a DMZ encompassing undisputed territory may
(in theory) serve to preserve parties' rights of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
B. Temporal Concerns: Facts Subsequent to the 1962
Judgment
Judge Donoghue suggests that because provisional measures are
constrained by both Articles 41 and 60, facts outside of the interpretation
proceedings should not be relevant to granting a request for provisional
measures.137 If so, this would remove the 2008-2011 clashes from the court's
consideration; these clashes, which resulted in loss of life and property
destruction, arguably served as the primary factual basis for the indication of
provisional measures.'38 The only other case with this statutory dynamic (and the

134

DMZs, also referred to as buffer zones, generally are created "to provide sanctuary, to provide a
neutral area that allows for supervision where contending claims exist (in order to, potentially,
facilitate cooperation), and to simply reduce tensions through separation of disputants." M. Shane
at
online
2003),
Sept
Consortium
(Conflict Information
Smith, Buffer Zones
http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/buffer-zones (visited Apr 22, 2012). All else equal,
the distance between disputants separated by a DMZ can have an appreciable effect on the
likelihood of lasting peace. One study finds that peace typically lasts when the DMZ is at least two
kilometers wide. Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-FireAgreements and the DurabilityofPeace 181
(Princeton 2004). In other border disputes, DMZs have been defined such that the zone extends
to land not subject to the territoriality dispute. See, for example, Security Council Res No 687,
UN Doc S/RES/687 (1991) (establishing an Iraq-Kuwait DMZ extending five kilometers into
Kuwait and ten kilometers into Iraq across the countries' border).

135

There is evidence that the temple itself was site to conflicts, and both parties agree that according
to Temple I, the temple belongs to Cambodia. See Temple II, Provisional Measures at **12-13 (cited
in note 4). Thus, while it made sense to include this territory in the DMZ from a non-aggravation
standpoint, sovereignty over the temple itself was not at issue in the case.

136

137

The lack of justification renders the zone susceptible to the criticism that it is arbitrary. Problems
may arise when a DMZ is mapped out on an uninformed basis without regard to factors such as
the parties' history, population distribution, and claimed property rights. See David M. Morriss,
From Var to Peace:A Study of Cease-FireAgreements and the Evolving Role of the United Nations, 36 Va J
Intl L 801, 853 (1996). Typically, DMZs are created with at least a reference point in mind, such
as an agreement mandating withdrawal by a specified distance from an identified cease-fire line. Id
at 907. Given this defect, the zone likely is imperfect in its coverage, and the court's credibility
may even be impaired. Nevertheless, the lack of explanation does not by itself connote an
overextension of court authority.
See Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at *3 (cited in note 59).

138

See id; Temple IH, Provisional Measures at **12-15 (cited in note 4).
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one that Donoghue relies on) is Avena.m' In Avena, Mexico sought interpretation
of language in a 2004 ICJ judgment ordering the US "to provide ... review and
reconsideration" of convictions and sentences imposed upon Mexican nationals
whose Vienna Convention rights were violated. 140 Mexico also requested
provisional measures that would stay the executions of certain Mexican nationals
in conjunction with the Article 60 proceeding.141 In granting provisional
measures, however, the Avena court considered the 2008 execution date of one
Mexican national and the ongoing risk of execution to several other Mexican
nationals-facts subsequent to the 2004 judgment it was called to interpret.14 2
Thus, the very case Donoghue uses to advance one element of his argumentAena, unlike Temple II, lies within the scope of the court's Articles 41 and 60
powers-cuts against another-under Article 60, facts subsequent to a judgment
should not bear on interpretation of the judgment.
If the goal of provisional measures is the preservation of parties' rights to
ensure effective judgment, then it is appropriate for the court to consider the
very facts evincing risks to these rights. Provisional measures are said to strike "a
compromise between the urgency of action ... and the sovereignty of states
which need not accept any action of a court without their consent."143 The court
has been and should be willing to make these compromises.
C. Precedential Concerns: No Prior Provisional DMZ
The court has issued provisional measures in three former border dispute
cases: FrontierDispute,'" Land and Maritime Boundary,14 5 and CertainActivities Carried
Out by Nicaraguain the Border Area.'4 6 Although the disputes concerned territory,
these cases demonstrate that the court will take steps to protect human life when
other sovereign rights are also at issue and that the court may even liberally
interpret the link requirement.147 Temple II, however, does stand apart from these
139

See Temple II, Donoghue Dissent at **3-5 (cited in note 59), citing Avena, Provisional Measures,
2008 ICJ at 311.

140

See Avena, Provisional Measures, 2008 ICJ at 312-14.

141

Id at 317.

142

143

See id at 329-32. In Avena, years had elapsed in between the original judgment and the request for
provisional measures; in Temple II, decades had elapsed. In both cases, the court faced the very
real need to update its understanding of the parties' situation to properly respond to the parties'
requests.
Oellers-Frahm, 12 German L J at 1284 (cited in note 15).

144
145

See generally FrontierDispute(Burk vMahz), Provisional Measures, 1986 ICJ 3 (Jan 10, 1986).
See Land andMaritime Boundary, Provisional Measures, 1996 ICJ at 13.

146

See CertainActivities CarriedOut ly Nicaraguain the BorderArea (Cost v Nica), Provisional Measures *1
(Mar 8, 2011), online at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 50/16324.pdf (visited Apr 3, 2012).
See Alison Duxbury, Saving Lives in the InternaionalCourt of Jusice: The Use of ProvisionalMeasures to
ProtectHuman Rghts, 31 Cal W Intl J 141, 157 (2000). See also Bernhard Kempen and Zan He,
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other cases with its unprecedented provisional DMZ. Nonetheless, each of the
other cases also differed from one another with respect to how the court
ordered the withdrawal of forces. In Frontier Dispute, the parties were given
twenty days to reach an agreement as to the bounds of troop withdrawal.148 In
Land and Maritime Bounday, troops were ordered to retreat back at least as far as
their positions prior to a certain date-the date of the parties' first armed
conflict relevant to the dispute.14 9 Most recently, the court ordered the parties in
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area to "refrain from
sending to, or maintaining in the disputed territory . . . any personnel, whether
civilian, police or security."150 It is, therefore, unremarkable that the court's
means of ordering military removal in Temple II differs from prior cases.
What of the court's inclusion of undisputed territory? This is a more
significant difference, but perhaps its effect is not far removed from an order for
forces to retreat to positions prior to a particular date. If forces occupied
positions outside of the disputed land, then such an order would also implicate
undisputed territory. Each measure attempts to preserve rights of sovereignty or
territorial integrity, though by different (perhaps imperfect) means.
There is a further question concerning the extent to which provisional
measures should be ordered in Article 60 cases. At the time of Temple II, Avena
was the only precedent for exercising Article 41 powers in an Article 60 case.
The indefinite window within which a party can bring an Article 60 case, and the
binding nature of an Article 41 indication, raise concerns of abuse.
Yet the same concern that animates the need for provisional measures in
other non-Article 60 cases holds for Article 60 cases. Namely, the actions of
either party could undermine the judgment (specifically, the announced
interpretation) if either party were permitted to pursue actions that erode the
rights of the other. For example, if the ICJ prescribed no measures to placate the
parties and if fighting persisted, then more locals would presumably be displaced
and further damage to the temple and local lands could ensue. Insofar as the
court seeks to clarify, and perhaps even vindicate, rights of sovereignty and
territorial integrity through its interpretation, the court would face a real risk that
this effort would be frustrated by the parties' acts diminishing these rights.
Additionally, Articles 41 and 60 functionally curb gross abuse of
provisional measures in an interpretation proceeding. As in a non-Article 60
case, the court must reason, in its published order, that the provisional measure
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preconditions have been satisfied."' While the indefinite jurisdiction window
exists, it is tempered by the requirement that there be prima facie evidence
demonstrating a genuine "dispute as to the meaning or scope" of the judgment
in question.152 Thus, these requirements create a limited world of cases and
available measures, while the court's self-interest in attracting consenting litigants
and maintaining its position of legitimacy limits its exercise of discretion.
The benefit of preserving party rights with Article 41 and inherent checks
against the abuse of Article 41 favor the continued use of interim measures in
Article 60 cases. Nevertheless, the ICJ should be discerning in these cases when
evaluating requests for provisional measures due to the unique concerns posed.
D. Forward-Looking Concerns: Negative Consequences
Though legitimate, the court's indication of provisional measure may
generate consequences that are not altogether positive. The provisional DMZ
arguably skirted the bounds of court authority.' 53 Hypothetically, this could
embolden future parties to request measures more tenuously linked to the rights
to be preserved. However, since the court can indicate measures that vary from
the parties' requests, it is unclear that radical requests would lead to the abuse of
Article 41 powers.'54 It is up to the court to exercise due restraint and to ensure
that the provisional measures indicated are sufficiently tied to party rights. As
mentioned in Section V.C, the ICJ has incentives to do just this in order to incite
party consent and build court legitimacy.
The greater risk is that Temple II could chill party consent to ICJ jurisdiction
or suppress party compliance with ICJ indications of provisional measures."'
Compliance with provisional measures admittedly is low, which has been
ascribed to a perceived lack of due process and abuse of authority in provisional
measure proceedings."' If Temple II exacerbates these concerns for future
parties, a possibility given the court's own division, parties may continue to
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disregard these orders or even bring their disputes to other forums."' These
chilling effects are of moment to the court, because, in a sense, states are the
court's clientele.'58 However, at present, it is hard to argue with what seems to be
a positive result. Cambodia and Thailand reacted favorably to the ICJ's decision;
both parties appear to be attempting to adhere to the court order; and there have
been no skirmishes since the measures were declared. If this continues, it seems
unlikely that Temple II will, on its own, chill requests for provisional measures or
suppress compliance rates. To the contrary, if Temple II becomes a mark of ICJ
success, this order could help raise the profile of provisional measures.
The critique that the provisional DMZ introduces implementation
challenges because it was insufficiently informed by ground realities is well
founded. As of December 2011, both parties agreed to withdraw from the
provisional DMZ but had not yet executed the withdrawal."' Even if
implementation moves forward without problem, information about population
distribution, local geography, property rights, and positions of forces is
perceived to be important in demarcating DMZs.'6 o A better solution might have
leveraged ASEAN and the parties' respective knowledge of the area to define
the DMZ through mediation."' This is distinguishable from a pure reversion to
dispute resolution by mediation or negotiation. Cambodia and Thailand tried
and failed to resolve their disagreement through mediation and negotiation prior
to Temple II.62 It would be imprudent to think that these methods, in isolation,
effectively would resolve the territoriality conflict. However, by invoking
mediation or negotiation within the framework of the ICJ, certain synergies may
be realized that are absent when these methods are pursued in isolation.
In this vein, the next section discusses why the interplay between ASEAN
and the ICJ actually may enhance the prospect of compliance with the indication
of provisional measures and why, from an IDR perspective, the ICJ's order was
crafted intelligently. I make the further point that provisional measures offer
particularly fertile ground for future use of integrated IDR approaches.
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VI. TEMPLE II: A CASE OF INTEGRATED IDR METHODS
Conflicts over territory or borders commonly turn combative.' 63 These
disputes can become politically charged matters for the states involved, as was
the case for Cambodia and Thailand. States must weigh their IDR options,
mindful of the tangled web of legal, political, and security issues.
The principal types of IDR are negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and
adjudication, each of which can be characterized by its level of party control and
enforceability.'64 Negotiation offers the greatest amount of party control, as it
involves direct party-to-party communication to settle the dispute."' For most
states, negotiation occurs through diplomatic channels and is the method of first
resort."'6 However, communications can easily break down, and agreements
reached are non-binding.'6 1 Mediation interjects a third party into the dialogue to
facilitate communication and agreement. 6 1 It permits a high degree of party
control (though less than negotiation), and does not generate binding
obligations.16 ' An arbitral panel's decision binds parties, though the dispute is
funneled through a process stripping parties of some control. 70 Adjudication
involves even less party control, but offers a binding judicial decision.''
Crucially, binding and enforceable judgments are not equivalent; adjudicative
bodies may lack the requisite enforcement capacity. Yet, at least so far as the ICJ
is concerned, reputational costs, court legitimacy, utility of court access, and
expressionism benefits enter into party compliance calculus and enable binding
judgments to stick. 7 2 Even so, the ICJ is a venue of last resort, and studies
indicate that amid armed conflict, states prefer mediation to adjudication.17
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Standing alone, these IDR mechanisms present sharp tradeoffs that go
beyond party control and enforceability. For example, adjudication before the
ICJ can be costly and slow, and it can fail to address underlying political, social,
or environmental issues.174 States may even disregard the binding nature of ICJ
orders and choose not to comply with adverse rulings, frustrating other IDR
efforts. As noted in Section II, this problem arises with indications of
provisional measures. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, the prospect of
compliance may still be greater than other non-binding IDR methods,
particularly in the presence of international pressures.17 1 Parties also benefit from
certainty of process. Though often preferred by parties, mediation is stunted by
its limited capacity "to adequately respond to the volume and array of
international disputes" 1 6 and by its low success rates. 77 On the other hand,
mediation is unlikely to infringe state sovereignty, provides ad hoc flexibility,
entails lower political costs, and enables states to maintain long-term
relationships, which is quite important in the context of neighboring states.178
Hybrid IDRs are a proposed solution to these assorted advantages and
disadvantages." 9 By blending IDR methods, the strengths of single methods can
be amplified and weaknesses diminished. As one scholar noted:
The ICJ can enhance the problem-solving qualities of mediation by
providing the institutional capacity of a powerful framework that establishes
a protective environment as parties engage in the cooperative, and
sometimes vulnerable, venture of problem solving. At the same time,
mediation can pick up where legal settlement stops by assisting parties in
resolving matters that extend beyond legal questions, into political,
environmental and social matters. Such approaches can enhance the
complementary dynamics of power and cooperation.o80
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While use of integrated IDR has been discussed, the framework still needs to be
developed. This will require more information about how it is being employed.'
Temple II can contribute to the evolving understanding of integrated IDR
methods. Following Temple I, Cambodia and Thailand attempted to resolve
border tensions through both diplomatic negotiation and ASEAN mediation.18 2
Failing resolution by these means, the parties turned back to the ICJ, seeking
interpretation of Temple I as well as provisional measures to preserve the rights
of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Cambodia and Thailand resorted to
negotiation, mediation, and adjudication in series. More remarkable was the use
of integrated IDR in the ICJ's indication of provision measures. The court
ordered the parties to "continue the co-operation which they have entered into
within ASEAN and, in particular, allow the observers appointed by that
organization to have access to the provisional demilitarized zone."" This
represents an order to pursue mediation and ICJ adjudication in parallel, a move
that leverages the complementary interaction between mediation and
adjudication. It is the first time in an indication of provisional measures that the
ICJ has referred states to a regional body to settle some aspect of a dispute.'
IDR, at both a regional and international level, affords additional benefits
to Cambodia and Thailand. While Asia is far from a "coherent unit,"' ingrained
in Asian Pacific states is a general preference for consensual decision-making,
good neighborly relations, and conflict avoidance mechanisms.' Mediation
through ASEAN is more conducive to honoring these regional values than is
mediation by a global organization or adjudication by the ICJ. 7 Furthermore,
conflict prevention is one of ASEAN's core competencies."8 International
exposure can also introduce broader reputational costs and political pressures
that create credible consequences for failing to resolve a dispute. Additionally, a
body like the ICJ has the benefit of international legitimacy and a proven track
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record. In contrast, the High Council of the Treaty of Amity of Cooperation, a
dispute resolution panel established by ASEAN, has not settled any disputes to
date."s' Including ASEAN in the operative language of the order enhances the
legitimacy and visibility of ASEAN. It also introduces the risk of Security
Council intervention should either party stop cooperating with ASEAN. 1
Provisional measures are uniquely suited to integrated IDR. First, an
integrated IDR approach can improve party compliance with the ICJ's indication
of provisional measures, while preserving the court's ability to make concrete
rulings of law through the judgment. The low provisional measure compliance
rate has been associated with perceived lack of due process, improper exercise of
court authority, and the politically charged nature of requests."' Although
integrated IDR would not solve fully compliance issues (particularly if a party
contested court jurisdiction and flatly refused all measures), returning some
control to the parties over the scope and terms of the measures through a
method like mediation or negotiation would help ameliorate these problems.
Second, due to the interim posture of provisional measures, mixed
methods of IDR can be implemented in parallel, as opposed to in series. Parties
often do pursue one method of IDR after another (thus the characterization of
the ICJ as a venue of last resort); however, this approach does not extract the
full complementary value of multiple IDR methods that comes from
contemporaneously combining methods. A court judgment calling for mediation
would channel the parties to mediation following adjudication. In contrast, an
order for provisional measures is capable of leveraging mediation to help
preserve the parties' rights in the midst of ongoing adjudication.
Finally, provisional measure IDR can accelerate party cooperation.
Provisional measures seek to preserve party rights pending judgment. To this
end, parties seeking a meaningful judgment have incentives to agree on
provisional-measure matters in a timely fashion through the complementary
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IDR method. Without time constraints imposed by the main proceedings and
2
judgment, IDR by negotiation or mediation, though flexible, risks protraction.
VII.CONCLUSION
In sum, the ICJ did not exceed its authority by establishing a provisional
DMZ in Temple II, even though the zone included undisputed territory. Under
the Statute of the ICJ, the court's powers to issue provisional measures are
broad. Furthermore, there is sound reason for affording the court additional
latitude when instituting non-aggravation measures. Hostility between Cambodia
and Thailand in recent years has elevated the urgency and risk of the border
conflict. The court rightfully weighed these concerns in an effort to preserve the
parties' rights, pending its interpretation of Temple I. In line with other border
dispute cases, the ICJ has once again demonstrated its willingness to break from
past practice and use novel means to preserve these rights.
Though the court may not have exceeded its authority in Temple II, this
does not eliminate concerns raised by the exercise of this authority. Provisional
measures are exceptional instruments that must be used sensibly. In view of the
evolving use of these instruments and the purported lack of compliance, the ICJ
should evaluate critically the scope of the provisional measures it indicates.
Apart from the creation of the provisional DMZ, the ICJ's order is
remarkable for yet another reason: its application of an integrated IDR
approach. Future ICJ indications of provisional measures stand to benefit from
an integrated IDR approach, as exemplified in Temple II. Tethering particular
measures to mediation or negotiation may not be appropriate in all cases, but it
is one way to realize simultaneously the benefits of party control, certainty of
process, and enforceability. This strategy is attractive for indications of
provisional measures given their interim nature and the opportunity to enhance
and expedite party compliance. The decision whether to adopt such an approach
will likely depend on the relationship between the states and the availability of a
suitable third party intermediary. Use of integrated IDR methods in provisional
measures is still in its infancy, so only time will tell the reach of its influence.
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